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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the law of interpretation has received a welcome 
flurry of attention. Much of this attention has focused on the 
ingenious argument advanced by William Baude and Stephen Sachs 
that originalism is “our law” and thus legally, as opposed to merely 
normatively, obligatory on constitutional interpreters.1 But as Baude 
and Sachs candidly acknowledge, any other approach to constitutional 
interpretation might also be our law—or might become our law at 
some point in the future.2 Thus, the law of interpretation and the 
“positive turn” that Baude and Sachs have sought to instigate 
transcends originalism and its critics.3 Indeed, the law of 
interpretation transcends constitutional interpretation. It also 
encompasses, at a minimum, the interpretation of statutes and 
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 1.  William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2352 (2015) 
(“[A] version of originalism is indeed our law.”); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of 
Legal Change, 38 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 817, 818 (2015) (“Originalism is usually called a 
theory of interpretation . . . . Best understood . . . originalism . . . [is] a theory of our law: a 
particular way to understand where our law comes from, what it requires, and how it can be 
changed.”). 
 2.  See Baude, supra note 1, at 2352 (“Originalists need not prove that originalism is 
inherent in “the nature” of constitutions or interpretation, just that it is a convention of our 
interpretation of our Constitution.”); Sachs, supra note 1, at 822 (“American law might be 
originalist in nature, but then again it might not.”). 
 3.  See Baude, supra note 1, at 2351 n.5 (“The ‘positive turn’ evokes the basic tenets of 
legal positivism: that the content of the law is determined by certain present social facts and that 
moral considerations do not necessarily play a role in making legal statements true or false.”); 
Sachs, supra note 1, at 819 (“This inquiry points the way toward what we could call ‘positive’ 
defenses—claims that originalism, as a matter of social fact and legal practice, is actually 
endorsed by our positive law.”). 
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regulations and the allocation of interpretive authority among and 
across courts, agencies, legislatures, etc.4 
One tricky feature of the law of interpretation in the United 
States circa 2018 is that it often seems to be broadly open-textured or 
otherwise pluralist. This may just be a superficial appearance. If we 
scratch the surface, perhaps there is sufficient consensus of the 
appropriate sort to say that originalism or common law 
constitutionalism is our law of constitutional interpretation, that 
textualism is our law of statutory interpretation, or that some strong 
form of Chevron and Auer deference are legally obligatory secondary 
rules of our law of interpretation. But arguments to this effect have 
generally met with significant skepticism. This skepticism, in turn, has 
led many to question the value of a positive turn in interpretive 
theory. If the positive law of interpretation is sufficiently open-
textured to accommodate most or all mainstream interpretive 
approaches, the positive turn begins to seem like a dead end.5 
This brief symposium article takes a different tack. As a thought 
experiment, it proposes a constitutional amendment explicitly 
mandating a nonoriginalist approach to constitutional interpretation. 
One motivation for this thought experiment is to sidestep debates 
over the content of the current U.S. law of constitutional 
interpretation and the extent to which that content is open-textured. 
A second motivation is to explore the implications of such an explicit 
interpretation amendment for various normative theories of 
constitutional decision-making. Broadly speaking, those implications 
are asymmetric. A constitutional amendment explicitly mandating 
nonoriginalism would strengthen the case for nonoriginalism, as 
against its originalist critics, more than a constitutional amendment 
mandating originalism would strengthen the case for originalism. 
 
 4.  William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1079, 1097–99 (2017); see also Abbe Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 
1750, 1759 (2010) (discussing state rules of statutory interpretation and the legal status of 
interpretive methodology in state courts more generally); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal 
Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085, 2086 (2002) (proposing the legislative 
adoption of Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation). 
 5.  See, e.g., Charles L. Barzun, The Positive U-Turn, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1357 (2017) 
(“[N]o defender of any controversial theory of legal interpretation can appeal to [] positivism 
for support.”); Mark Greenberg, What Makes a Method of Legal Interpretation Correct?: Legal 
Standards vs. Fundamental Determinants, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 105, 115 (2017) (“Hartian 
positivism makes little room for a law of interpretation that goes beyond what is already widely 
accepted.”). 
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Without further ado, here is my proposed amendment: 
Section 1. The United States Constitution, including this 
Amendment, shall be construed to accommodate the practical 
exigencies of human affairs6 and the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.7 
Section 2. Originalism is not our law and never has been.8 
As Section 2 implies, this is intended as a clarifying amendment. 
Contrary to the views of some originalists, the U.S. Constitution as it 
now stands does not compel an originalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation.9 More important for present purposes, the 
Constitution could not have been written to compel such an approach, 
nor could it be amended to do so. Even if the constitutional text 
explicitly mandated originalism, nonoriginalist Supreme Court 
justices and other constitutional decision-makers would still have 
good normative reasons for ignoring that mandate, reading it flexibly, 
or following it selectively.10 At most, such an amendment might supply 
countervailing normative reasons for adhering to originalism, which 
may or may not outweigh the reasons for adhering to some form of 
nonoriginalism. Or so I shall argue.11 
 
 6.  Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (describing “a 
constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the 
various crises of human affairs.”). 
 7.  Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”). 
 8.  Contra generally Baude, supra note 1; Sachs, supra note 1. 
 9.  See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025, 1039–43 (2010) (explaining these points); but see 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 857, 859 (2009) (arguing that Article VI, by making “This Constitution . . . the 
supreme Law of the Land,” mandates originalism). 
 10.  Throughout this article, I shall generally use the term “constitutional decision-maker,” 
rather than judges or justices, to bracket controversies about the proper distribution of 
interpretive authority across institutions. Occasionally, this nomenclature has proved too 
awkward, and I have simply referred to judges or justices as representative interpreters. Neither 
these references nor anything in the language of my proposed nonoriginalism amendment is 
meant to imply any view on the proper role of courts relative to other institutions in 
constitutional interpretation. 
 11.  Of course, whether one has good normative reasons to do something does not depend 
on whether one is an originalist or a nonoriginalist. But in this article, I do not mean to take a 
position on which reasons ultimately and properly bear on constitutional decision-makers. 
Instead, my approach is to take the premises of the various approaches as given and ask what 
follows if those premises are correct. Thus, when I say “nonoriginalists would have good reasons 
to do X,” I simply mean that constitutional decision-makers would have good reasons to do X if 
the premises from which most nonoriginalists proceed are correct. I will use this shorthand 
throughout. 
COAN READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2018  5:14 PM 
86 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:2 
The same does not hold for an amendment explicitly mandating 
nonoriginalism. Rather, the logic of originalism would compel nearly 
all committed originalists to respect the original meaning of such an 
amendment. The only originalists for whom this would not be true are 
what I have called “substantive originalists,” who embrace the 
Constitution’s original meaning because they believe it to be morally 
just or likely to produce good practical consequences.12 But this is a 
relatively small group. Other originalists would be compelled by their 
own precepts—popular sovereignty, written constitutionalism, legal 
positivism, etc.—to embrace nonoriginalism. 
This would hardly resolve all interpretive disagreement, but it 
would go a long way toward eliminating a huge quantity of basically 
unproductive debate about the legal and moral necessity of 
originalism.13 In turn, the energy currently expended on this debate 
could be redirected to far more pressing matters of constitutional 
substance. I believe this would be a salutary development all around. 
But my principal goal in this article is not to defend the desirability of 
a nonoriginalism amendment. It is to explore and reflect upon the 
theoretical implications of such an amendment for originalism and 
nonoriginalism and for the positive turn more generally. 
Part I explains why an amendment mandating originalism would 
not bind nonoriginalists. Part II explains why an amendment 
mandating nonoriginalism would bind most originalists. Part III 
sketches some of the theoretical implications of this asymmetry. 
I. NONORIGINALISM UNBOUND 
The thought experiment I propose to conduct in this article 
actually requires not just one proposed constitutional amendment, but 
two—the “nonoriginalism amendment” and a corresponding 
“originalism amendment” with which to compare it. I have already 
provided the text for my proposed nonoriginalism amendment. Here 
is its originalist counterpart: 
 
 12.  See Andrew Coan, The Foundations of Constitutional Theory, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 834, 
837 (defining substantive theories as those that “contend that the correct approach to 
constitutional decision-making is determined by the moral desirability of the decisions it 
produces, however moral desirability is defined”). 
 13.  Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Pretense of Necessity in Constitutional Theory, JOTWELL 
(May 16, 2012), http://conlaw.jotwell.com/the-pretense-of-necessity-in-constitutional-theory/ 
(describing the “pathologies” of this sort of debate for constitutional theory). 
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Section 1. The United States Constitution, including this 
Amendment, shall be construed to reflect the original public 
meaning of its text, as amended. 
The burden of this Part is to demonstrate that, even if this 
amendment were ratified, nonoriginalist Supreme Court justices and 
other constitutional decision-makers would still have good normative 
reasons for ignoring that mandate, reading it flexibly, or following it 
selectively. 
I intend this to be a strong claim, so let me begin by setting aside 
two weaker versions of it. First, I do not mean to argue merely that 
nonoriginalist constitutional decision-makers would be free under my 
proposed originalism amendment to adhere to nonoriginalist 
precedents. My proposed amendment says nothing about stare decisis, 
which is the subject of much controversy among originalists.14 If some 
committed originalists believe it permissible for judges to adhere to 
nonoriginalist precedents, it follows a fortiori that nonoriginalists 
operating under the mandate of my proposed originalism amendment 
might also consider it permissible to do so. But the claim I mean to 
defend here is stronger. 
Second, I do not mean to argue merely that nonoriginalist 
constitutional decision-makers would retain significant freedom to 
draw on considerations other than original meaning in cases where 
original meaning is under-determinate. Most contemporary 
originalists acknowledge that original meaning is, at least sometimes, 
under-determinate and that, in such cases, it is not only appropriate, 
but unavoidable for constitutional decision-makers to rely on 
nonoriginalist considerations.15 It follows a fortiori that nonoriginalists 
operating under the mandate of my proposed originalism amendment 
could also draw on nonoriginalist considerations in the “construction 
zone.”16 Just slightly more controversially, nonoriginalists operating 
under my proposed amendment might also draw on nonoriginalist 
considerations to determine the standard of proof required to place a 
 
 14.  Compare Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Role of Precedent, 22 
CONST. COMMENT. 289, 291 (2006) (rejecting stare decisis as inconsistent with originalism) with 
Baude, supra note 1, at 2358 (defending stare decisis as an element of “inclusive originalism”) 
and Sachs, supra note 1, at 861–64 (similar). 
 15.  See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, 117 (2010) (“If Originalists are willing to accept that constitutional doctrine 
should and must change over time within the limits imposed by the original meaning of the text, 
then they can accept a constrained version of Living Constitutionalism.”). 
 16.  See id. 
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question in the construction zone.17 But again, the claim I mean to 
defend here is stronger. 
That claim is as follows: Under my proposed amendment, 
nonoriginalist constitutional decision-makers would have good 
normative reasons for refusing to follow original meaning even in 
cases where that meaning is adequately determinate and where stare 
decisis does not strongly compel a nonoriginalist result. I assume for 
present purposes that such cases exist in meaningful numbers on 
important issues. In other words, I assume that originalism and 
nonoriginalism are operationally distinct.18 I believe this to be true, 
but it is a bigger question than I can take on here, in part because it 
turns on an active debate over how to define each of the two camps.19 
There are two basic reasons that an originalism amendment would 
not strongly constrain nonoriginalists. The first and less important is 
logical. No text, including a proposed constitutional amendment 
mandating a particular approach to constitutional amendment, is self-
interpreting. Like any other legal text, my proposed originalism 
amendment itself requires interpretation, and nonoriginalists would 
naturally approach that task using a nonoriginalist approach. Of 
course, there are a wide variety of nonoriginalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation, resting on a wide variety of normative 
foundations—representation reinforcement, common-law 
constitutionalism, pluralism of various kinds, to name just a few.20 On 
many, if not all, of these approaches, the original public meaning of a 
recently adopted constitutional text carries substantial interpretive 
weight. But what makes an approach nonoriginalist, as I am using the 
term, is that original meaning is not necessarily decisive. 
As such, a nonoriginalist interpreting my originalism amendment 
might, for a variety of reasons, read the words “to reflect” as 
nonexclusive. She might also read the amendment’s reference to the 
 
 17.  See Ryan C. Williams, “The New Originalism and the Problem of Proof” (Apr. 13, 
2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author) (“[D]etermining whether sufficient 
uncertainty exists to allow the move from interpretation to construction necessarily involves 
normative decision-making in the selection of a standard of proof against which claims about 
constitutional meaning can be judged.”). 
 18.  If originalism and nonoriginalism are not operationally distinct, then an amendment 
mandating either would have no normative significance. 
 19.  Compare Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in 
Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015) with Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and 
Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007). 
 20.  See generally Coan, supra note 12 (surveying types of nonoriginalism and the 
normative foundations on which they rest). 
COAN READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2018  5:14 PM 
2018] AMENDING THE LAW OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 89 
“U.S. Constitution” as limited to the written constitution, as opposed 
to the unwritten constitution that many nonoriginalists believe 
supplements and occasionally supplants the written document.21 
Either of these readings might be defended on grounds of 
representation reinforcement or the Burkean virtues of common-law 
constitutionalism or the pragmatic benefits of nonoriginalism. A more 
carefully drafted originalism amendment could probably squeeze out 
these specific textual indeterminacies, but it would be difficult and 
perhaps impossible to squeeze out all such openings for nonoriginalist 
interpretation of an originalism amendment. 
Even if this were possible, there is a second reason why an 
originalism amendment would not strongly constrain nonoriginalists. 
Let us presume that an explicitly worded amendment of this sort—
read in isolation—would have the same meaning under any plausible 
contemporary interpretive approach. Nevertheless, a normative 
argument would still be required for adhering to this instruction in 
interpreting the rest of the Constitution. If democratic principles 
justified the application of a representation-reinforcement approach 
to constitutional interpretation before the adoption of an originalism 
amendment, this would remain a strong argument for nonoriginalism 
even after the adoption of such an amendment (especially if the 
amendment process itself suffers from significant malfunctions). The 
same goes for Burkean arguments for common-law constitutionalism 
and consequentialist arguments for constitutional pragmatism. 
This is not to suggest that the adoption of an originalism 
amendment would be normatively irrelevant for nonoriginalists. Such 
an amendment would clearly raise the costs of applying a 
nonoriginalist interpretive approach to other provisions. If judges and 
other constitutional decision-makers felt free to ignore the language 
of an originalism amendment, would any constitutional provision be 
safe? Such an amendment would also pretty clearly be part of the 
positive law, which most theorists agree that constitutional decision-
makers are presumptively obligated to follow.22 But these costs could 
 
 21.  See generally, e.g., AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012) (arguing that the U.S. has an unwritten 
constitution); Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 
(1975) (arguing the same). 
 22.  See, e.g., Baude, supra note 1, at 2351 n.5 (“The ‘positive turn’ evokes the basic tenets 
of legal positivism: that the content of the law is determined by certain present social facts and 
that moral considerations do not necessarily play a role in making legal statements true or 
false.”); see generally Barzun, supra note 5. 
COAN READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2018  5:14 PM 
90 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 13:2 
well be outweighed by the substantive unattractiveness of an 
originalist approach relative to plausible nonoriginalist alternatives 
(and to the alternative of abandoning the Constitution altogether). If 
an originalist approach was sufficiently unattractive substantively, but 
so was jettisoning the Constitution, the normatively best option would 
be for judges to ignore an originalism amendment and instead apply 
some other interpretive approach to the remainder of the 
constitutional text.23 
An example will help to make the point more concrete. Imagine 
that an originalist interpretation of the commerce clause would 
require reversal of Wickard v. Filburn24 and a rollback of much of the 
modern federal regulatory state.25 An amendment mandating 
originalism would certainly give nonoriginalist judges and other 
officials some reason to adopt this course. Refusing to do so might 
create costly uncertainty about their commitment to the Constitution 
as a whole or represent a democratically illegitimate attempt to flout 
the will of the American people. An originalism amendment would 
also pretty clearly represent the positive law, and judges are widely 
assumed to have at least a presumptive obligation to follow the law. 
On the other hand, the collective wisdom embodied in the last 80 
years of commerce power precedents would still provide a powerful 
reason for common-law constitutionalists to adhere to these 
precedents. The instability and disruption of expectations, as well as 
the (arguably) bad policy consequences of adopting an originalist 
approach, would provide powerful reasons for pragmatist judges to 
 
 23.  An important implication is that interpretive choice need not be all-or-nothing, pace 
many originalists. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 59 
(1999) (making the all-or-nothing argument); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 635–36 (1999) (“We are bound because we . . . profess our 
commitment to a written constitution, and original meaning interpretation follows inexorably 
from that commitment. We can easily jettison that original meaning . . . but this is a choice [] 
courts and scholars have been generally unwilling to make.”). Both constitutional text and 
original meaning can be embraced in part or in whole, depending on the values that would be 
served by either approach. I will have more to say about this in Theoretical Implications, see 
discussion infra Part III. 
 24.  317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 25.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 101, 119–20 (2001) (“In sum, the original meaning of the regulatory powers granted to 
Congress might have been broader had Article I, Section 8 granted it the power ‘to regulate the 
commercial interests of the States’ rather than the power to regulate only ‘commerce.’”); 
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism’s Bite, 20 GREEN BAG 2D 103 (2016); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately to 
observe that our case law has drifted far from the original understanding of the Commerce 
Clause.”). 
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follow the same course. These reasons may or may not be more 
powerful than the reasons to follow an explicit originalism 
amendment, but it is at least plausible that they would be, if not in this 
case then in others. Think of Brown v. Board of Education,26 which 
Michael Klarman and many others have argued cannot be squared 
with the original meaning of the 14th Amendment.27 Would saving 
Brown be strong enough reason to ignore an explicit originalism 
amendment? On the premises of many nonoriginalist approaches, a 
strong case could be made for an affirmative answer. 
One final wrinkle is worth mentioning. Just as there are many 
different forms of nonoriginalism, there are many different normative 
grounds for embracing nonoriginalism. An originalism amendment 
would affect some of these grounds more than others. Although 
relatively few nonoriginalists explicitly embrace nonoriginalism on 
positivist grounds, such an approach is both theoretically coherent and 
has real attractions. Moreover, some versions of common-law 
constitutionalism and pluralism might plausibly be understood as 
resting at least partially on positivist grounds.28 Given the strong 
consensus that precise constitutional texts are authoritative as a 
matter of positive law, an originalism amendment would significantly 
undermine positivist arguments for nonoriginalism. It would also 
weaken popular sovereignty arguments for nonoriginalism, to the 
extent that a recently adopted originalism amendment would 
presumptively give originalism the imprimatur of the American 
people. On the other hand, this democratic argument for originalism 
might be counterbalanced by the undemocratic aspects of originalism 
and would, in any event, lose force over time.29 
These are the exceptions, however. By and large, the strength of 
most normative arguments for nonoriginalism would be unaffected by 
the adoption of an originalism amendment. The adoption of such an 
amendment would increase the costs of applying a nonoriginalist 
approach to other constitutional provisions but those costs might well 
be outweighed by the benefits of a nonoriginalist approach. Both the 
 
 26.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 27.  See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A 
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1881 (1995) (“[T]he overwhelming 
consensus among legal academics has been that Brown cannot be defended on originalist 
grounds.”). 
 28.  See Coan, supra note 12. 
 29.  See Richard Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 
192–99 (2008) (arguing that democratic justifications for originalism lose force over time). 
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costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, but it is highly plausible 
that many nonoriginalists would be normatively justified (taking their 
own premises as given) in sticking with a nonoriginalist approach in 
some or all cases. 
II. ORIGINALISM BOUND 
Precisely the opposite is the case—or would be the case—for 
originalists operating under my proposed nonoriginalism amendment. 
That amendment would strongly constrain most originalists to 
embrace a nonoriginalist approach to constitutional decision-making. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the law of constitutional interpretation is 
thus far more susceptible to textual amendment in favor of 
nonoriginalism (which treats text as one of many important 
considerations) than it is to textual amendment in favor of originalism 
(which gives text a preeminent role). The reasons for this parallel the 
reasons that an originalism amendment would not strongly constrain 
nonoriginalists. 
First, originalists’ own methodological commitments would 
obligate them to interpret my proposed nonoriginalism amendment 
according to its original public meaning. That meaning would quite 
clearly mandate an approach to constitutional interpretation that 
permits changed circumstances and practical considerations, as well as 
changing values, to override the original public meaning of the text. 
The fact that no text is self-interpreting is a problem for the proposed 
originalism amendment discussed in Part I because such an 
amendment cannot easily control its own interpretation by the 
nonoriginalist interpreters it is seeking to bind. By contrast, the 
interpretive commitments of the originalist interpreters that my 
proposed amendment seeks to bind are not an obstacle. To the 
contrary, my nonoriginalism amendment leverages those interpretive 
commitments to ensure that originalists cannot, except on pain of self-
contradiction, wiggle out of the amendment’s interpretive mandate. 
Second, unlike nonoriginalists operating under an originalism 
amendment, most originalists operating under my proposed 
amendment would have no good normative reasons for ignoring its 
mandate, reading that mandate flexibly, or following it selectively. To 
the contrary, the normative grounds on which most originalists 
embrace originalism would require them to follow the original 
meaning of a nonoriginalism amendment just as they would the 
original meaning of any other constitutional text. Of course, there are 
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several different normative grounds on which to embrace originalism. 
In previous work, I have organized these grounds into four broad 
categories: metaphysical, procedural, substantive, and positivist.30 Of 
these, only substantive arguments for originalism might supply a good 
normative reason for originalists to resist a nonoriginalism 
amendment. 
Most originalists would not have such a reason. Metaphysical 
originalists embrace originalism because that approach is inherent in 
the idea of interpretation or binding law or writtenness.31  If that is the 
case, the only way to interpret my nonoriginalism amendment (or 
treat my amendment as binding law or honor its writtenness) is to 
follow its original meaning. That original meaning, of course, 
repudiates originalism and obligates interpreters to follow a 
nonoriginalist approach.32 Procedural originalists embrace originalism 
because it is the original meaning of the Constitution and only the 
original meaning of that text was democratically ratified by the 
American people.33 If that is the case, the original meaning of my 
nonoriginalism amendment democratically obligates constitutional 
decision-makers to follow a nonoriginalist approach to constitutional 
interpretation.34 Finally, positivist originalists embrace originalism 
because they believe originalism to be the positive law of U.S. 
constitutional interpretation.35 My nonoriginalism amendment would 
change that positive law to nonoriginalism, legally obligating 
constitutional decision-makers to follow that approach. This assumes 
 
 30.  See Coan, supra note 12. 
 31.  See id. 
 32.  This might seem to give rise to a paradox. Under a nonoriginalism amendment, the 
nature of interpretation or writtenness or the like would compel constitutional decision-makers 
to adopt an approach inconsistent with the nature of these very commitments. But the paradox 
is only apparent. Originalists carrying out the mandate of a nonoriginalism amendment would 
be faithfully following the original meaning of the written text. Nothing in the nature of 
interpretation or writtenness, as metaphysical originalists understand these concepts, limits the 
communicative content that a written text may convey. This resolution of the apparent paradox 
is loosely parallel to Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s argument that federal administrative 
agencies exercising power under a validly enacted federal statute are always exercising 
executive power even if that power would appear to be legislative if exercised without statutory 
authorization. See generally Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002). Similarly, originalist judges and officials engaged in 
nonoriginalist interpretation under the mandate of a nonoriginalism amendment are always 
interpreting the original meaning of the written text even if their interpretive endeavors would 
appear to be noninterpretive or inconsistent with the written Constitution if undertaken in the 
absence of a clear textual command. 
 33.  See Coan, supra note 12. 
 34.  See id. 
 35.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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that an explicit constitutional amendment would be recognized as 
validly changing the positive law of interpretation, but that seems like 
a safe assumption. 
Substantive originalism poses a trickier case. Broadly speaking, 
substantive originalists embrace originalism because they believe it 
produces morally desirable results.36 But there are several distinct 
strands of substantive originalism. Some substantive originalists 
believe that the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution as currently 
drafted happens to be morally attractive (or at least attractive 
enough). This could be otherwise, but because it is not, these 
originalists believe that constitutional decision-makers will do best by 
following an originalist approach.37 Other substantive originalists 
believe that only originalism is capable of adequately constraining the 
discretion of judges and other constitutional decision-makers.38 If 
either of these views is correct and if a nonoriginalist amendment 
would produce worse—or less constrained—constitutional results, 
then these substantive originalists might have good normative reasons 
for ignoring a nonoriginalism amendment in part or in whole. Of 
course, those reasons would have to be weighed against the 
countervailing risks. But in principle, the bad consequences of a 
nonoriginalism amendment could be sufficient to justify a refusal to 
follow its clear original meaning in order to preserve the benefits of 
an originalist approach to the rest of the constitutional text. 
Again, a couple of examples will help to make the point more 
concrete. Imagine that a nonoriginalist interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause or Privileges or Immunities Clause would allow 
judges to exercise unconstrained power over virtually every aspect of 
American political life. A nonoriginalism amendment would certainly 
give substantive originalist judges some reasons to acquiesce to this 
result. A refusal to follow the clear command of a nonoriginalism 
amendment would itself represent a form of rebellion against 
constitutional constraints on official decision-making. Such a refusal 
might also generate constitutional instability and uncertainty about 
the willingness of constitutional decision-makers to abide by other 
inconvenient provisions of the Constitution. Finally, a nonoriginalism 
amendment would pretty clearly be the law, which originalist judges 
would be presumptively bound to follow. 
 
 36.  See Coan, supra note 12. 
 37.  See id. 
 38.  See generally, e.g., Barnett, supra note 23. 
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On the other hand, if the premises of substantive originalism are 
sound, the refusal to follow a nonoriginalism amendment might be the 
only way to prevent the tyranny of an unconstrained judiciary. At a 
minimum, adhering to an originalist interpretation might produce a 
significantly more constrained—and thus better—system of 14th 
Amendment review.39 These reasons may or may not be more 
powerful than the reasons to follow an explicit nonoriginalism 
amendment, but it is at least plausible that they would be—if not in 
this case, then in others. Think of the commerce power, where many 
originalists believe a nonoriginalist approach has destroyed the 
substantial benefits of federalism that would flow from following an 
originalist approach.40 The good consequences of an originalist 
approach may or may not be more powerful than the reasons to 
follow a nonoriginalism amendment, but taking substantive originalist 
premises as given, it is at least plausible that they would be. This is all 
the more likely once we consider that my proposed nonoriginalism 
amendment leaves plenty of room to make pragmatic arguments on 
behalf of constitutional interpretations that happen to coincide with 
original meaning. 
It remains to consider a third group of substantive originalists who 
believe that the supermajoritarian amendment and ratification 
processes are likely to produce good results. Since it is the original 
meaning of the constitutional text that those processes ratify, 
constitutional decision-makers will do best by following an originalist 
approach.41 This is essentially an epistemic argument that the results 
of the constitutional amendment are more likely to represent socially 
desirable outcomes than are the decisions of less epistemically 
trustworthy constitutional decision-makers like modern-day judges 
and politicians. A nonoriginalism amendment would put substantive 
 
 39.  This assumes that the original meaning of the Equal Protection and Privileges or 
Immunities Clauses would be substantially more constraining than nonoriginalist interpretations 
of those clauses. Most substantive originalist arguments take this assumption for granted, 
though certain recent originalist work calls it into question. See generally, e.g., RANDY 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); 
Balkin, supra note 19; Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016). 
 40.  See generally, e.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All Delegated Power: A Response to 
Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. F. 180 (2014), http://www. 
yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-sum-of-all-delegated-power; Randy Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, 
Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (1996). 
 41.  See generally JOHN MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE 
GOOD CONSTITUTION (2013). 
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originalists of this type in something of a bind. On the one hand, the 
nonoriginalism amendment would itself be a product of the 
epistemically trustworthy amendment process. On the other hand, 
constitutional decision-makers following that amendment would be 
required to ignore the epistemically trustworthy outcomes of all prior 
amendment processes. Probably, the epistemic trustworthiness of a 
nonoriginalism amendment would be sufficient to require this strand 
of substantive originalists to follow it, just as they would the original 
meaning of any other amendment that overrode earlier constitutional 
provisions, but the question is a tricky one. 
Substantive originalists, however, are the exception. By and large, 
most normative arguments for originalism would require their 
adherents to submit to a nonoriginalism amendment. This would still 
leave much room for interpretive disagreement. For instance, under 
my nonoriginalism amendment, originalists would remain perfectly 
free to argue that some or all aspects of original meaning are the best 
way to accommodate the practical exigencies of human affairs. They 
would also remain free to argue that some or all aspects of original 
meaning best reflect the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society. Perhaps social maturity lies in 
recognizing the wisdom of our forebears. What originalists would be 
foreclosed from arguing is that originalism is legally or conceptually 
necessary. Instead, originalism would be left to fight it out on equal 
normative footing with other contenders. 
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
I believe this would be a salutary outcome all around. Debates 
over the legal and conceptual necessity of originalism have consumed 
far too much time and energy that could more productively be spent 
debating vital questions of constitutional substance. Nonoriginalism, 
in my judgment, is also a far more sensible approach to constitutional 
decision-making. But I do not have much new to say in defense of 
either of these points. Instead, I want to spend the remainder of this 
article briefly reflecting on the theoretical implications of this thought 
experiment for originalism and nonoriginalism—and for the positive 
turn more generally. 
First and most straightforwardly, the thought experiment 
underscores that the arguably open texture of the current U.S. law of 
interpretation is a contingent, rather than a necessary, feature of our 
legal system. It is possible to imagine a world in which that law was 
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written into the constitutional text. Of course, this world is unlikely to 
become a reality. But imagining it is helpful for thinking through the 
implications of a positive turn for both originalism and 
nonoriginalism. From the current literature, which has focused largely 
on the determinacy or indeterminacy of the current law of 
interpretation, it is easy to miss that there would be strong normative 
arguments for nonoriginalism even if originalism were written into 
the constitutional text. It is also easy to miss that originalism and 
nonoriginalism are asymmetric in this respect. If nonoriginalism were 
written into the constitutional text, most normative arguments for 
originalism would disappear. 
This asymmetry suggests a new line of response to positivist 
arguments for originalism. Thus far, most nonoriginalist criticism of 
the positive turn has focused on Baude and Sachs’s claim that 
originalism is our law. But my thought experiment demonstrates that, 
even if originalism were clearly our law, the normative justifications 
for nonoriginalism would retain substantial potency. If those 
justifications are arguably strong enough to overcome the mandate of 
an explicit originalism amendment, it follows a fortiori that they are 
arguably strong enough to overcome an unwritten positive law of 
constitutional interpretation grounded only in an uncoordinated and 
semi-conscious consensus of judges. Indeed, if nonoriginalists can 
persuade a critical mass of judges to embrace these arguments, the 
consensus that made originalism our law would dissolve like a rope of 
sand. 
A similar point holds for substantive originalism. As with 
nonoriginalism, the thought experiment makes clear that substantive 
normative justifications for originalism—unlike other normative 
arguments for originalism—would retain substantial potency even if 
nonoriginalism were clearly our law. If those justifications are 
plausibly strong enough to overcome the mandate of an explicit 
nonoriginalism amendment, it follows a fortiori that they are plausibly 
strong enough to compel adherence to originalism if there is no 
positive law of interpretation at all, as many critics of the positive turn 
contend. Substantive originalist arguments may even be strong 
enough to overcome an unwritten law of interpretation mandating 
pluralism or common-law constitutionalism (of the sort suggested by 
some readings of Philip Bobbitt and David Strauss).42 As with 
 
 42.  See Coan, supra note 12. 
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nonoriginalism, if substantive originalists can persuade a critical mass 
of judges to embrace their arguments, the consensus that made 
pluralism or common-law constitutionalism our law would dissolve 
like a rope of sand. 
So far so good for substantive originalism. But my thought 
experiment also raises significant questions about this form of 
originalism. If substantive originalist arguments would retain 
significant force even in the face of an explicit nonoriginalism 
amendment, is it really appropriate for these arguments to trade on 
the broader originalist claim that originalism “correspond[s] to the 
legal rules that judges and officials are already bound to apply?”43 
This claim may or may not be true, given the present content of U.S. 
positive law, but the normative arguments of substantive originalists 
suggest that they should—or at least could—be committed to 
originalism even if it ceases to correspond to positive law. If that is 
true, then substantive originalism seems to be more about producing 
good consequences and constraint than adherence to existing law. At 
a minimum, substantive originalists should think carefully about how 
much normative work each of these considerations is doing in 
motivating their embrace of originalism. 
That is not all. If the good consequences and the constraining 
power of originalism might be strong enough to overcome even an 
explicit nonoriginalism amendment, they might also be sufficient to 
justify other departures from original meaning in cases where some 
available alternative would produce better results or more strongly 
constrain constitutional decision-makers. For example, if the original 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is as capacious and 
open-ended as some contemporary originalists seem to believe, a 
common-law constitutionalist or Thayerist interpretation of that 
clause may well be more constraining than an originalist 
interpretation.44 This suggests that substantive originalists should 
reconsider the view that the Constitution (and its original meaning) 
must be accepted or rejected in toto. If good consequences and official 
constraint are the relevant maximands, substantive originalists should 
 
 43.  Sachs, supra note 1, at 828. 
 44.  Compare generally Barnett, supra note 23 with The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36 (1873) (reading the Privileges or Immunities Clause very narrowly); see also James B. 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 
129, 140 (1893) (arguing that “an Act of the legislature is not to be declared void unless the 
violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt”). 
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adhere to original meaning when, but only when, doing so promotes 
these ends.45 
For other forms of originalism, the implications of my thought 
experiment may be even more striking. Put simply, the thought 
experiment makes these forms of originalism appear normatively 
unmoored. If they were overridden by constitutional amendment, the 
normative commitments of non-substantive originalists would require 
them to submit meekly to nonoriginalism. Even more striking, these 
originalists would have no strong arguments for reversing a 
nonoriginalism amendment—or even for lamenting originalism’s 
demise. This raises the question: How could anyone care very 
passionately about defending originalism? This question is hardly 
unanswerable, but my thought experiment casts the range of possible 
answers in a new and helpful light. In particular, it suggests that 
originalists who feel inclined to defend originalism even in the face of 
a nonoriginalism amendment can only be coherently motivated by 
substantive, rather than metaphysical, procedural, or positivist, 
considerations. In this way, my thought experiment serves as a sort of 
“get-to-know-yourself” exercise for originalists. If you think of 
yourself as a positive originalist or a procedural originalist but would 
feel inclined to defend originalism even in the face of a 
nonoriginalism amendment, you just might be a substantive originalist 
after all. Which is okay! In my view, that is the best kind of originalist 
to be.46 
At the same time, my thought experiment suggests a new line of 
attack against nonoriginalism—or at least a new point of emphasis. If 
originalism is our law and if others wish to change that, my proposed 
nonoriginalism amendment demonstrates that it is reasonably clear 
how they can do so. It is also reasonably clear that most originalists 
would feel compelled, by their own premises, to accept the outcome. 
By contrast, if nonoriginalism is our law and others wish to change 
that, my proposed originalism amendment demonstrates that it is not 
clear how they would do so. Even if such an amendment successfully 
changed the law of interpretation, nonoriginalists might refuse to 
 
 45.  I bracket the possibility that the good consequences and constraining force of 
originalism would be destroyed or undermined if constitutional decision-makers felt free to 
make any exceptions whatsoever. This seems implausible to me, but obviously cannot be 
dismissed out of hand. 
 46.  Cf. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 41, at 1 (“Law in general and constitutional 
law in particular should be measured by its contribution to our current welfare.”). 
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acquiesce in the change. On this account, originalism might be 
thought to provide a coherent and normatively attractive theory of 
constitutional change. Nonoriginalism, by contrast, might be thought 
to impede the possibility of such change and perhaps block it 
altogether, at least as to the law of interpretation.47 
The same point can be put more simply. Originalists are principled 
and consistent, while nonoriginalists will simply make whatever 
arguments are necessary to advance their own political and 
ideological goals. Originalists are so principled, in fact, that they will 
give up their preferred interpretive approach if that is what the 
constitutional text requires. Nonoriginalists, by contrast, will go so far 
as to defy clear constitutional text if it impedes their ability to reach 
the results they prefer. 
I do not believe this argument to be ultimately persuasive, but this 
is not the place for an extended response.48 The important point for 
present purposes is that the argument is unambiguously normative (as 
opposed to positive or metaphysical) in character. It is an argument 
that originalism should be our law because it embodies an attractive 
theory of constitutional change (or because it is more principled). It is 
not an argument that originalism is our law or that originalism is 
inherent in the concept of interpretation or written constitutionalism. 
As such, the argument’s persuasive power depends on the relative 
attractiveness of originalism and nonoriginalism. Reasonable minds 
can surely disagree on this point, but this is terrain on which 
nonoriginalists have traditionally felt more comfortable than 
originalists.49 
Finally, and perhaps most important, the thought experiment 
suggests that both originalists and nonoriginalists should think more 
 
 47.  I am indebted to Will Baude for this point. Cf. Sachs, supra note 1. 
 48.  Among other things, such a response would emphasize that a major purpose—or at 
least a major consequence—of originalism is to make constitutional change extremely difficult. 
See generally Andrew Coan & Anuj Desai, Difficulty of Amendment and Interpretive Choice, 1 
J. INST. STUD. 6 (2015). It would also emphasize that the principles of political morality, on 
which nonoriginalism is premised, are not subject to override or alteration by constitutional 
amendment. Put simply, nonoriginalists are perfectly principled and consistent. It is just that the 
theory that they are committed to in a principled way is ultimately one of political morality. If 
this theory sometimes requires constitutional decision-makers to ignore or read a clear 
constitutional amendment selectively, that is only because such an approach is (sometimes) 
what the best understanding of political morality requires. Moreover, no mainstream 
nonoriginalist approach permits constitutional decision-makers simply to pursue their own 
personal vision of political morality without constraint by considerations of institutional 
competence, democratic legitimacy, the rule of law, etc. 
 49.  See generally id. 
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deeply about the nature and grounds of constitutional decision-
makers’ presumptive obligation to follow the law. That obligation has 
played a large role in motivating the positivist turn, in part because it 
is the subject of such broad consensus. But that consensus may be 
shallower and shakier than it first appears. It is certainly easier for all 
sides to accept when they believe it consistent with their own 
preferred interpretive approach. The prospect that both originalism 
and nonoriginalism could be overridden by explicit textual 
amendment puts in stark relief several important questions that often 
go unasked: Just how strong is the presumptive obligation to follow 
the law? What is required to rebut the presumption? Does it matter 
whether the law in question is enacted by supermajorities of the 
American people, or arises from an uncoordinated consensus of 
judges, or is simply the whim of a capricious and tyrannical dictator? 
The answers depend, at least in part, on how we understand the 
nature of law and the ways in which law creates content-independent 
normative obligations, if it creates them at all. These questions are 
much debated by legal philosophers but have received comparatively 
little attention from constitutional theorists. It may be time for that to 
change. 
CONCLUSION 
If I woke up tomorrow to discover that the American people had 
adopted my proposed nonoriginalism amendment, I would be happy. 
But I do not expect that to happen tomorrow or any other day, with 
this amendment or any other I might propose. I have thus crafted the 
amendment not so much as a serious proposal but as a thought 
experiment that might have some value even in the exceedingly likely 
event that it is never adopted. That thought experiment has 
interesting implications for both originalism and nonoriginalism and 
shines a light on some of the deep jurisprudential questions raised by 
the positive turn. Those questions are worth asking and attempting to 
answer even if the law of constitutional interpretation is never 
amended in the ways contemplated in this article. 
 
